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THE e f f e c t s of w o r l d r e c e s s i o n a n d c risis upon 
mining in t he s a d c c .
i n t r o d u c t i o n.
This paper concerns mining in the SADCC in the context of the' 
present world crisis. As such it concentrates on the bulk of 
mineral-metal extraction in the region which is for export onto the 
world market, primarily to the industrialized OECD countries.The 
potentially important area of intra-regional mineral-metal trade is 
not considered.
THE CONFERENCE AND MINING
The 1980 SADCC Lusaka declaration emphasized as a founding concept, 
the reduction of dependence, particularly, but not only on South 
Africa (RSA). The states of the SADCC are especially dependent on 
the. West and the RSA for mineral exploitation and mineral markets. 
Minerals contribute over 50% of their joint export earnings and the 
mining sector is the second largest contributor to their overall 
G.D.P. after agriculture (see Table 1).
In 1981 Zimbabwe presented the SADCC Council of Ministers with a 
report on REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE MINING INDUSTRY (SADCC, 1 981 ) , 
which outlined areas of possible regional cooperation, such as: 
mineral beneficiation, manpower training, mineral marketing and 
mining financing and technology. Subsequently Zambia was given the 
portfolio for coordinating the mining sector.
A programme of action on the mining sector was approved by the SADCC
Council of Ministers in May 1984. The projects include: a skilled 
manpower survey, an inventory of mineral resources, a study on small 
scale mining, processing and marketing, a study on the manufacture 
of mining machinery and chemicals, and the manufacture of
l
fertilizers, a study on the rationalisation of mineral processing 
and a study on the development of an iron and steel industry (SADCC 
1984). As yet these studies have no funding.
The striking aspect of this programme is not what it includes but 
rather what it excludes. The crucial and controversial area of 
minerals marketing has been dropped from the original Zimbabwean 
proposal and no mention has be'en made of a possible regional 
approach to mining legislation, particularly policy on the mining 
TNCs. But it is too early to assume that these two vital areas are 
not on the agenda for a later date. The SADCC as a body has 
generally been somewhat cautious and it could be that the areas of 
minerals marketing and mining legislation are considered to be too 
contentious at this time especially as foreign private investment is 
being sought at the moment.
AN OVERVIEW OF MINING IN THE STATES OF THE SADCC.
Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary of the economic, trade and mining 
situation in the SADCC region. Of the nine SADCC economies, in no 
less than five, mineral exports accounted for greater than 40% of 
total export receipts in 1981 (since then Lesotho's only, diamond, 
mine has closed). As a group, in the same year, the total value of 
mineral production was about 3.8 billion $US and mineral exports 
contributed roughly 58% of total export receipts.
Three of the SADCC states have virtual mono-mineral economies.
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notably Angola with oil, Zambia with copper and Botswana with 
diamonds., At the other extreme three have only small or 
underdeveloped mineral sectors, namely Tanzania, Malawi and 
Mozambique. Two countries, Lesotho and Swaziland, formerly exploited 
important mineral resources but these are currently exhausted, 
depleted or uneconomic. Lesotho had diamonds and Swaziland had iron 
ore while its asbestos reserves are almost exhausted. The final 
country in the SADCC grouping, Zimbabwe, has a mineral sector of 
moderate size in relation to the overall economy which represented 
5.2% of G.D.P. and 40% of export receipts in 1981. Zimbabwe produces 
a wide variety of minerals, many for internal consumption. No single 
mineral is dominant. In 1982, for example, gold represented 15%, 
ferro-alloys 8% and asbestos 6% of export receipts.
THE MINING TNCs AND THE SADCC.
Throughout the SADCC region, control of the mining industry is 
generally in the hands of the large mining TNCs. This control is not 
only exerted directly through ownership (equity) but also indirectly 
at various points in the mineral-metal cycle going from inputs 
(equipment/technology) to the extractive phase, through mineral 
processing and metals refining, to the marketing of the final 
product. The mining TNCs frequently also have indirect control via 
management or technical services contracts, an example of which is 
Wankie Collieries, where the Zimbabwean state has 40% of the equity 
and the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa (AAC of SA) has 
20%, but the AAC are still the "Administrative and Technical 
Advisors" (Wankie Colliery Co. Ltd., 1983), through their subsidiary 
AAC Services Ltd.
Of the mining TNCs the Anglo-De Beers group is by far the largest in 
the region (see Figure 1 ) if not the world. This mining and finance
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colossus consists of the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, 
De Beers Consolidated Mines and the Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investment Company (JCI) in South Africa, Minerals and Resources 
Corporation (MINDRCO) in Bermuda and Charter Consolidated in London 
plus a myriad of subsidiaries spread across the globe.
The AAC-DeBeers mining interests in the SADCC region are given in 
Figure 1 . Briefly, they stretch from: diamonds in Tanzania, Angola^ 
and Botswana, now the world's largest producer (1983=10.7 million 
carats), copper in Zambia and Botswana, nickel in Zimbabwe and 
Botswana, coal in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Swaziland, to chrome and 
ferrochrome alloys in Zimbabwe.
Other major TNCs involved in mineral extraction in the SADCC include 
Gulf Oil and Texaco in Angola (petroleum) and Amax in Botswana 
(copper and nickel). Amax appears to be in the process of shedding 
its southern african interests: in 1982 it sold its 30% share in 
Tsumeb Corp. Ltd. in Namibia and in 1984 it sold its 7% share in 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (African Business, 09.84).
Union Carbide, Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), Lonrho and Falconbridge all 
have mining interests in Zimbabwe. These and several other TNCs such 
as Shell, Esso and BP are also involved in mineral exploration in 
the SADCC region.
Anglo and Lonrho also have significant interests in other sectors of 
the SADCC economies. For example, in Zimbabwe, Anglo holds 53% of 
Border Timbers Ltd., 30% of Hippo Valley Estates Ltd., 18% of 
National Foods Holdings Ltd., and 39% of RAL Holdings Ltd.(Anglo 
American Corporation of South Africa, 1983, p.67), in addition to 
its holdings in the mining sector. Lonrho in Malawi holds 32% of 
Dwangwa Sugar Corp. Ltd., 10% of Chibuku Products Ltd. (maize beer)
and 51% of David Whitehead & Sons Ltd. (textiles). In Zimbabwe, 
Lonrho holds 100% of the Wattle Co. Ltd., 60% of W. Dahmer & Co. 
Ltd. (vehicle builders), 100% of Zambesi Coachworks Ltd. 
(coachbuilders) and 100% of Zimoco Ltd. (vehicle distributors). It 
also has wide ranging non-mining interests in Zambia and Swaziland 
(Lonrho, 1982, p.51).
WORLD CRISIS AND MINERALS-METALS
The most obvious effect of the recent world crisis on 
minerals-metals has been their dramatic fall in price. This is 
adequately demonstrated in Table 3. •
Metals and minerals dropped 12% in export price in 1981, 8% in 1982 
and 2.2% in 1983. This is equivalent to a 26% drop from 1980 to 
1983.
The export volumes of metals and minerals from developing countries 
have also undergone a marked fall. Table 4 indicates a drop of 2.1% 
in 1982 and 1.9% in 1 983 which is equivalent to a total fall of 4% 
over these two years.
Table 4 also gives the change in value of mineral and metal exports 
of developing countries between 1965 and 1981. This seems to 
indicate a 600% increase of this period but the increase is in 
CURRENT $US. Table 5 gives real metal prices indexed back to 1970.
It is apparent from these Tables that the response to the crisis has 
not been the same for all minerals-metals. Though similar, the 
behaviour of fuels, precious metals and "other" minerals-metals have 
all been markedly different. Fuels and precious metals have held 
their value over the longer term (from 1970) but joined the general 
decline in both value and volume from 1980. The only base metal to
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perform well in terms of value has been tin, but it has had dramatic 
drops in volume. World smelter production of tin has dropped from 
245,000t in 1979 to 220,000t in 1982 (Metallgesellschaft, 1983, 
p.67), and shows no increase on 1941 (219,000t), whilst at the same 
time tin stocks in 1 983 stood at 108,000t or 67% of annual world 
consumption (Shearson, American Express, 1984, p.2). Tin's atypical 
behaviour is most probably due to it being the only metal with an 
active producer organization, the International Tin Council (ITC), 
with effective market intervention to protect value.
SADCC MINERALS-METALS AND WORLD CRISIS
' •
With the exception of petroleum in Angola, diamonds in Botswana, 
Angola and Tanzania, and gold in Zimbabwe the SADCC minerals-metals 
fall into the worst hit, non-fuel and non-precious group (see Tables 
1 and 2). Most SADCC metals-minerals have declined in real value 
over the last 15 years and dramatically declined in both export 
value and volume since the- onset of the present world crisis. The 
causes for this are manifold but the most important are the 
following three. Unlike petroleum and tin which have strong producer 
organizations (OPEC and the ITC) with which to combat attempts by 
the developed countries to export their crisis to the periphery, in 
the form of declining terms of trade (manufactures vs commodities) 
the SADCC minerals (see Tables 1 and 2) are "unprotected". The worst 
cases are copper and nickel which in 1 983 were worth 46% and 36% 
respectively of their 1970 unit value (see Table 5). In addition, 
western world consumption dropped 9% for copper and 25% for nickel 
between 1979 and 1982 (see Table 6). The SADCC region accounted for 
9% of copper and 8% of nickel production in the western world in 
1982 (see Table 2).
Diamonds, on the other hand, have a TNC marketing monopoly, the De
Beer's Central Selling Organisation (CSO), which has managed to 
maintain the real value of diamonds except for the diamond crisis of 
1980/1 when the CSO temporarily lost control of the price due to 
excessive speculation . by diamond buyers. Diamond production 
increased in volume from 41 million carats in 1977 to 57 million 
carats in 1983 (Engineering and Mining Journal, March 1984,p.90) and 
the CSO sales increased by 27% from 1257 million US$ to 1599 million 
US$ from 1982 to 1 983 (De Beers, 1983 and 1984). From the end of 
1968 to the end of 1 983 the REAL value of rough diamonds increased 
by 57% (Ousey,B.,1 984 ).
The second reason is that precious* metals-minerals benefit from 
speculation provoked by the economic uncertainty prevalent at the 
onset of crises, which does not apply to the non-precious 
metals-minerals whose prices drop rapidly with falling industrial 
demand.
This brings us to the third, developing country-specific, dynamic. 
Mineral exports for many third world economies are the major means 
of earning hard currency, so when the unit value of their mineral/s 
declines, they attempt to increase their production and sales so as 
to avoid cutting.back on vital imports. In this way supply often 
increases or remains constant during periods of falling demand 
resulting in an oversupplied "buyers' market" and low prices. These 
lower prices provoke a further increase in production to maintain 
foreign currency flows by the third world producers which again 
results in lower prices, and so the downward spiral continues.
As a result of falling foreign exchange earnings aggravated by high 
interest rates stemming from the OEGD crisis, third world mineral 
economies have.. ."extensive loans to pay off and their need for 
foreign currency is so great that production must continue
8unabated". (Shearson/American Express, 1984,p.5), resulting in 
0versupply and lower prices. In addition, mining tends to be capital 
intensive, requiring large imports of capital goods which with the 
prevailing low prices is often financed by loans, increasing debt 
servicing commitments. Other hard currency costs such as the mining 
TNC's profit repatriation or management fees and expatriate salaries 
are common for third world mining industries.
MINERAL PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS - THE CASE OF TIN.
Tin has maintained its value (see Table 5) in the face of falling 
consumption (see Table 6) and very high stocks which stood at 67% of 
annual consumption in 1983 (Shearson-American Express, 1984,p.E2). 
The I.T.C. maintains a buffer stock which is added to via purchases 
of tin on the open market when demand is weak and depleted via 
selling when demand is strong. The ITC also exerts export controls 
on its members during periods of continued low demand.
An argument against producer organisations intervening in the "free 
market" to set "false" prices is that over time these minerals will 
suffer from substitution by.other, now relatively cheaper minerals 
or non-mineral substitutes. Tin's high stocks and falling 
consumption are given as examples of the penalties for this sort of 
"overpricing". This type of argument would only be valid, though, if 
it could be shown that the total value of the decreased consumption 
of an "overpriced" mineral is less than the total value of the 
increased consumption with lower prices of a "free market" priced 
mineral. A calculation comparing tin, copper and nickel consumption 
using values from Table 5, for the period 1972 to 1982 is presented 
in Table 7.
yTABLE 7.
TOTAL REAL VALUE OF CONSUMPTION (1970=100)
METAL : UNIT VALUE J CONSUMPTION : TOTAL VALUE
1972 1982 %chg 1972 1982 %chg 1972 1982 %chg
Tin 100 1 49 +49% 100 86 -14% 100 128 +28%
Copper 100 62 -38% 100 114 + 14% 100 71 -29%
Nickel 100 68 -32% 100 109 +9% 100 74 -26%
Sources: Table 5 for unit values,
Metallgessellschaft,1983,for consumption data.
The results from this "experiment" would appear to come down 
strongly in favour of a policy of coordinated producer 
market intervention. Although consumption of both copper and 
nickel increased from 1972 to 1982,*the total indexed value 
of that consumption decreased by 29% and 26% respectively. 
Both copper and nickel are traded relatively "freely" with 
no market "tampering" by producer organizations. On the 
other hand, although the consumption of tin was down some 
14% over this period, the total indexed value of that 
consumption rose by 28%.
FUTURE PROSPECTS
Although the Industrialized market economies strengthened in 
1983 and the first half of 1984 with an average GDP growth 
rate in 1983 of 2.3% (World Bank, 1984), demand for most 
metals and minerals, stayed weak with developing countries 
experiencing a fall in the export volume of their metals and 
minerals of 1.9% and a fall in prices of 2.2% (see Table 3).
Even if the OECD recovery continues the prospects for 
non-cartelized and non-precious metals and minerals are not 
encouraging due to the following factors:
10
1 ) . The present high stock levels that need to be absorbed before 
demand can outstrip supply.
2) . The present low mine capacity utilization meaning that any 
increase in demand can rapidly be soaked up by extra production from 
existing mines.
3) . The present high debt servicing ratio of many third world 
producers will encourage them to continue with the present tendency 
of "export or bust" guaranteeing an oversupplied market and low 
prices.
•
It will take a long period of sustained economic recovery in the 
OECD countries before stock levels come down, unused mine capacity 
is absorbed and subsidised producers go into the "black".
The prospects for the non-precious and non-cartelized minerals and 
metals 'in the longer term can perhaps best be assessed by the 
historical performance of the commodities. In times of world boom 
their real {terms of trade) value tends to decrease and in times of 
world slump their real unit value tends to decrease faster, as is 
borne out by Figure 2. The long term prospects should therefore 
rather be viewed in terms of "bad" prospects or "worse" prospects 
depending on growth or recession in the industrial countries except 
in the low probability case of hard commodities being cartelized.
THE SADCC - PROSPECTS FOR METALS AND MINERALS.
Hard commodities have tended to lose their real value over time 
except for metals and minerals that have strong producer 
organizations or have a speculative (hoarding) value other than for 
industrial use. Therefore the prospects for mineral exports for the
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states of the SADCC will to a large extent depend on the extent to 
tfhich their exports are dependent on minerals and metals that are 
cartelized or speculative (precious).
FUEL MINERALS: The only petroleum production in the SADCC is in 
Angola. Petroleum exploration is being carried out in several of the 
other SADCC countries such as Tanzania and Mozambique. Coal is 
currently mined in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and 
Zambia (Table 2).
Although the real value of oil has fallen since 1981, it has 
increased substantially since 1973 (Table 3) and is likely to 
maintain its real value over the longer term as non-OPEC production 
is peaking meaning that OPEC's share of the market will steadily 
increase in turn strengthening OPEC's power to determine value and 
coerce renegade producers.This augurs well for the export earnings 
of Angola (which has applied for OPEC membership), but with oil and 
oil products already the principal import of most other SADCC 
states, terms of trade in the region as a whole are likely to 
deteriorate further.
Projects for the production of fertilizer from natural gas are under 
way in Tanzania and under consideration in Mozambique. It is 
envisaged that this production will mainly be for the local, 
regional market.
Because of coal's close association through substitutability with 
cartelized petroleum, demand has increased substantially since 1973. 
Coal has no effective producer organization and world reserves are 
huge. In addition several new producers have come onto the export 
market over the last few years. Coal has a low value to weight 
ratio, which Beans that distance to markets is an important factor
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in its export feasibility for the SADCC region. For example in 1982r 
only 36% of the final value of South African coal in Europe was the 
cost of mining it. By far the greater cost is for moving it from the 
mines to the OECD end users (Portheine, 1983, p.C3). The world 
recession and overproduction has meant that in 1983 South African 
coal was worth 18% less, in real terms, than in 1 976 (Mining Journal 
Ltd., 1984, p.81).
It would be difficult for the states of the SADCC to break into the 
presently oversupplied world market *on a large scale, given the 
region's logistical disadvantages, but future increases in the real 
price of oil or sustained recovery in the West, could put coal 
exports back on the agenda. For Botswana, world coal prices would 
have to double for its ambitious coal export plan, to be viable 
(Financial Mail, 17:08:84, p.43).
PRECIOUS METALS: Prospects for the SADCC precious metals-minerals
are somewhat brighter. As mentioned before, diamonds, gold, platinum 
and silver have a speculative attraction which often results in
demand for these commmodities increasing during periods of economic
uncertainty, high inflation and low interest rates. The price of all 
four of these precious minerals shot up in unison in 1980 (see Table 
5) in response to the deepening crisis and a loss of confidence in 
the US dollar at the time.
Diamonds, in addition to having a speculative value, are also 
effectively cartelized through the De Beer's marketing monopoly, the 
CSO. Gold and platinum, on the other hand, have a "country
concentration". South Africa presently has more than 60% of the 
western world's gold production and more than 80% of platinum
—production (Table 2). The extent to which their present relatively
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producer supply control would be difficult to determine, but either 
*ay the future of these minerals-metals appears to be secure enough 
to at least predict a maintenance of real value. This bodes well for 
the export earnings of Botswana (66% diamonds in 1 983) and to a 
lesser extent for Angola (8% diamonds in 1983) and Zimbabwe (15% 
gold in 1 982), but the rest of the SADCC exports little or none of 
these commodities (Table 1).
OTHER METALS-MINERALS: Of the other minerals and metals produced in 
the SADCC, the main foreign exchange earners are copper in Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Botswana, cobalt in Zambia, nickel in Zimbabwe and 
Botswana, chrome in Zimbabwe and asbestos in Zimbabwe and Swaziland.
The world crisis has provoked drastic reductions in both the value 
and consumption of these commodities and even with limited economic 
recovery in the OECD countries over the next few years, the 
prospects for these non-cartelized and non-precious minerals and 
metals do not look bright as over-supply, under-capacilty production 
and high stock- levels are likely to continue.
The objective conditions for producer organizations within the SADCC 
are not good as the region does not have a significant share of 
world production of any mineral or metal (see Table 2). The 
possibilities of producer collaboration with its neighbours looks 
better especially for cobalt (Table 2) where Zambia and Zaire have 
over 50% of world production between them.. But whether the necessary 
subjective conditions of political will exist for effective 
cartelization is doubtful.
With the USSR being the world's biggest chrome producer with 36% in 
1982 and South Africa the second with 26% in 1982 (Engineering and
producer control will come about for chrome even though southern 
africa has over 50% of western world production (Table 2) and over 
80% of world reserves (Hall, 1983, p.J16).
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